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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002294

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DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA (LUACES), NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER)
GENEVA FOR CD
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TAGS: [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [IS](#) [CDG](#) [ISRAEL](#) [RELATIONS](#) [GOI](#) [EXTERNAL](#)

SUBJECT: FMCT: ISRAELI WILL OPPOSE WEOG CONSENSUS; REQUESTS
POLITICAL-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON WAY AHEAD ASAP

REF: A. STATE 92033

[1](#)B. TEL AVIV 2228

[1](#)C. TEL AVIV 1930

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

[1](#)1. (C) Israeli MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Ambassador Miriam Ziv told Ambassador Jones on June 12 that Israel will not be able to join consensus on a Western Group (WEOG) endorsement of the U.S. FMCT initiative, nor remain silent if all other members of the WEOG join consensus. Ziv allowed that Israel could join consensus on a formulation of WEOG support for the U.S. initiative if it is worded in a way that "excludes Israel as part of a WEOG endorsement" of the initiative.

[1](#)2. (C) Ziv, joined by Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Deputy Director General Ariel Levite and MFA Arms Control Department Director Alon Bar, made the following additional points:

A) Israel feels betrayed by the U.S. decision to table the draft FMCT and mandate without consulting first. In Israel's view, U.S. action violates an understanding between two close Allies based on recognition of Israel's unique security requirements, and acknowledged in exchanges of letters with both Presidents Clinton and Bush. Ziv and Levite noted that they both had recently visited the U.S. and asked their USG interlocutors to consult with them before any action was taken on the FMCT. They claimed that during those visits, they were not given any indication that a U.S. decision to table a draft FMCT had been made.

B) Israel is being led to understand that the tabling of the FMCT is a tactic designed to bring to the fore the question of the CD's relevance. While Israel can understand the thinking behind this approach, it cannot view the FMCT as a tactical issue. For Israel, the FMCT is a strategic issue with vital implications for Israel's national security. Like all his predecessors, the new Prime Minister is seized with the issue; all nuclear matters fall under his purview. Israel will take no decision at the CD without approval from the Prime Minister.

C) This issue should have been -- and must now be -- discussed at the political level. Israel sees no value in having experts discuss the way ahead. Israel would prefer to have a high-level USG official visit Israel as soon as possible, so that any proposed resolution to the current situation could be run by the Prime Minister for his approval. The next round of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue, which is to be held in Israel, could serve as the forum for such a discussion. However, Israel might want the discussion to take place even sooner than the dialogue. On instructions from PM Olmert, FM Livni said Israel had "grave concerns" about the FMCT in a June 10 telephone call to Secretary Rice.

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D) Israel does not desire "any unnecessary confrontation" with the U.S., nor does it seek to create obstacles in the CD. Ziv cited as evidence of this Israel's silence during the June 12 WEOG meeting. Israel prefers that discussion of this issue remain within capitals and out of the press. A small handful of GOI officials deal with the issue in Israel, and it is extremely politically sensitive.

[1](#)3. (C) Ziv -- who had previously received talking points provided for the meeting that were cleared by NEA/IPA, ISN/MNSA, T and the NSC -- presented the Ambassador with a non-paper classified SECRET that laid out Israel's objections to the U.S. FMCT initiative in detail. (NOTE: The non-paper was sent the evening of June 12 via classified e-mail to ISN/MNSA and NEA/IPA. END NOTE.)

[1](#)4. (C) Ambassador Jones undertook to relay Israel's position to Washington as soon as possible. On use of the Strategic Dialogue to discuss the way ahead, the Ambassador suggested that Israel, as host, propose to State one or more dates as soon as possible. The Ambassador stressed that the U.S.

tabled the FMCT with the view that it is the agenda item most likely to achieve consensus and unblock ten years of deadlock at the CD.

15. (C) IAEC DDG Levite said that Israel thinks the FMCT is inherently flawed, and stressed that the timing of the USG initiative is problematic. He claimed that Under Secretary Joseph told him in early May consultations that the entry into force (EIF) clause would not pertain to Israel, but only to the P-5, and that Israel requested written assurances to that effect. Levite claimed he was told that such assurances should be easy to obtain. He stressed that Israel was therefore surprised when, two weeks later, the CD WEOG was told that the EIF provisions will pertain to the P-5 and Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK. Israel thus sees the U.S. initiative as a setback in substance as well as to the consultative process.

16. (C) Levite said that Israel could not realistically join WEOG endorsement of the U.S. initiative, and then turn around and try to block consensus in the CD plenary. It does not have the leverage that the U.S. has to garner support for its position, and risk drawing international approbation that would be unacceptable and affect Israel in other fora. He said that Israel feels it is being asked to "pay the price" in order to promote the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative.

17. (C) Levite said that the FMCT will also play into Iran's hands as it will establish the principle of civilian enrichment which is not in the NPT and which Iran will use to claim a right to have a complete nuclear fuel cycle. He said the FMCT will weaken pressure on Iran, noting the following:

A) Article 4 of the NPT, as currently interpreted, allows Iran to have nuclear reactors, but not a fuel cycle.

B) The FMCT allows the production of fissile materials for civilian purposes. Iran will produce fissile materials for its weapons program, and claim that they are for its civilian energy program. Without any verification provisions, the FMCT will be "the worst for Israel." Iran will say that, per the FMCT, it has a right to have a complete fuel cycle.

18. (C) MFA Arms Control Department Director Alon Bar said that -- based on his readout from the WEOG meeting earlier in the day -- he is not sure that other WEOG members will endorse the U.S. initiative. He claimed that there is growing concern among WEOG members that taking a consensus position to the larger plenary might "create alienation" among other CD members. Bar also argued that other WEOG members have concerns about the U.S. draft negotiating mandate, and that still others fear the repercussions that would follow news that Israel could not support WEOG consensus on the FMCT. Such a development might block progress on the FMCT within the CD. Bar further claimed that the U.S. representative pushed for WEOG consensus in the June 12 meeting, insisting two times that the "group needs to take action." Bar urged that the U.S. reconsider calling for WEOG consensus, suggesting that the news of a lack of consensus -- which he predicts -- would harm U.S. and Israeli interests.

19. (C) Levite used the meeting to ask if the Ambassador had any information about the package of "sticks and carrots" presented to Iran by EU HighRep Solana. He claimed that Israel's sources suggest that the package Solana presented only contained sticks and no carrots. He noted that, when asked, the State Department spokesman refused to comment, but did not deny this assertion. The Ambassador replied that he had no information about the package, and that Israel should be wary about drawing conclusions from press reporting.

110. (C) COMMENT: Our GOI interlocutors could not be clearer about their strongly held views on the FMCT. If we are to effect a change in their position, it will have to be through an intervention at the political level with the PM or possibly the FM. Please advise. END COMMENT.

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